Bowers Final Chapter, Or More Of A Critical Review

If I didn't agree that we need to be worried about what digital technology is doing to us, I would dismiss Bowers as a grumpy old hack. My argument would basically be that he is presenting a new version of the master/slave morality. Cultural Commons is good, and abstraction is evil. Cultural Commons is best embodied in face to face interaction. The written word is seen as the best expression of abstraction and how it spreads. He has and values the cultural commons, but power is held by those that use and champion abstraction. Neither side needs to be clearly defined or explained because it is clear to people on the side of cultural commons what is good and what is evil. This leads to the polemic tone and feel of the work as well as a partial explanation for why he is sparse on details.

If I didn't take his concerns about our future and the part that technology is playing in it, I could stop there and not really give another thought to the book. However, I think his concerns are very valid and that his points are often very interesting, and sometimes very good. Since that is the case, my approach will be to try to bridge the difference between what is set up as evil with what is set up as good. In this way I would hope to show in more detail what each is while at the same time showing a productive way forward that tries to address his concerns but comes from more of a middle ground approach. What follows is a sketch of what I mean.


“The difference between reading about a person’s craft knowledge and skill in making something and actually observing—or more importantly, being physically, creatively, and mentally engaged in carrying out the task on one’s own terms, is the difference between living in the limited world of abstractions and being fully involved in the multiple world of emergent relationships.” He goes on here to talk about reading about a musical performance and actually participating in one. I think the example of music is great, but I would use it in a different way, one that emphasizes the interpretable nature of writing.

I don’t think many people would say that picking up a sheet of printed music and playing it doesn’t involve some sort of interpretation. There is a lot that musical notation can tell you about how a piece should be played and how it should sound, but it can’t tell you everything. Recording a piece of music does more than writing out the musical notation. It tells you exactly how the piece should sound, and from there a talented musician can figure out how it should be played. There is no room for interpretation if you take the recording to be the definitive version of the work.

But how many artists think that what they recorded is the definitive version that can’t be changed. Live performances are often different and that is not just because the band may not have the technology (or even skill) to reproduce exactly what was done in the studio. A song can be reinterpreted if the artist thinks they, the audience or the song itself has changed and has something new or different to say.  Musical notation obviously needs interpretation. I would argue that the written word does as well. And, even a live performance (the face to face version) and a recording are not the definitive version of a piece of music. It can always be interpreted in new ways, especially by the artist that wrote it.

Descartes is one of the philosophers that Bowers mentions as being responsible for the abstract nature of the Enlightenment and modern world. I can see how that is a reasonable interpretation of Descartes. He does place a lot of importance on ‘clear and certain notions’ as the source of truth and reality.  These things are abstractions like the idea that triangles have three sides and that physical objects have extension.  But I am reading a book by a former professor of mine on The Meditations, and the reading proposed in the book is that they are truly meditations that have an experiential component that is essential to the proper understanding of Descartes' project. Unless you do what Descartes asks you to do in the book, or think his thoughts along with him, you are not going to get the full picture of what he is trying to convey and convince you of. Descartes' Meditations are not just a logical argument in words; they are being engaged in to carry out the task.

Most people may not see the printed words as being interpretable, and they may view it as Bowers portrays it: as a static fixed message giving static truths. However, that is not what it has to be. (And as a student of philosophy, it has been a long time since I have  see it that way.) Any piece of writing can be understood as an interpretation of something real, and one that can itself be interpreted. Emphasizing the fact that writing is interpretation and the interpretable nature of the written word can help counter a lot of what Bowers is against without throwing out the benefits of writing. Writing is not abstract in the way that Bowers sees as negative if the ability of the community reading the text to interpret it is emphasized. Writing is not abstract in the way that Bowers sees as negative if we are taught to read in a way that assumes the gaps in the text need to be filled with participation, experience or even meditation upon the subject the text is talking about. This, I think, can bridge the gap between writing and the cultural commons. It is a way of (to use a phrase and idea from Nietzsche) going beyond the strict distinction between good and evil. It can also be seen as an adaptation of hermenutics to every day reading and writing, not just sacred or academic texts.

The next step would be to find a way to go beyond the division between technology and data and experience. A recording of something is often see as a more definitive version of it than a written description or notation whether it is a video, audio recording or picture. The data derived from specialized equipment that observes an event is often seen as offering a more definitive version of the event than our senses, and even of a video recording. Both of these are very deceiving. It takes the context (time and place, and history) out of the event that is being recorded in the same way that Bowers says writing does. (Bowers even mentions this in the book.) However, he doesn't seem to offer a solution to the problem. I would say that the solution is for people to understand data and recordings the same way I propose they see writing. The recording or data set is just one interpretation of the event, and they can themselves be interpreted. Being aware of this is, I think, the biggest way to counter the negatives that Bowers sees coming from them. I sense this as an option in his writing, but I don't remember him pointing it out specifically.

I know this doesn't address many points in the book nor does it really address the last chapter specifically. What it does do is try to address the main problem(s) or flaw(s) that I saw in the book that kept coming to mind as I was reading.

Bowers Chapter 6

I like a lot of the points that he makes about the current state of culture and wisdom in the modern world, and how technology and science (scientism) have made an impact on that. I do still think he is selling short abstract thinking (especially philosophy), print and the West in general. I agree that data is over emphasized and the limitations of it are something most people are blissfully ignorant of. (We are at the same time ignoring all of the negatives that can come about along with the positives of convenience that we enjoy.) And I agree that it will come back to bite us. I agree that profits and convenience have taken over as the dominant values that influence how we (and especially businesses) make decisions. And I agree that it will come back to bite us. Culture is not much more than entertainment these days, and wisdom is outsourced to computers that run algorithms and sift data. These are things that need to be corrected, and he offers some good ideas in that respect.

However, I think he misses a whole host of elements that are in western culture that could be taken up and emphasized to help rehabilitate it and instead he goes to non-western cultures for solutions. Yes, analytic philosophy is abstract and tries to neatly categorize and explain things, and in doing so it misses a lot that it doesn’t even realize it is missing: unknown unknowns. But that is not all analytic philosophy. Even more so, there is the continental tradition as well which in many ways tries to keep the whole and the emergent in our minds as it inquires into the particulars. Nietzsche and Heidegger are two of my favorites, and they have elements of the whole and even a kind of mysticism to them, especially Heidegger’s later works after the ‘turn.’ Nietzsche’s Birth of Tragedy talks about the irreconcilable tension between the Apollonian and Dionysian, a relationship that constantly needs to be re-negotiated to provide a ground for thought and society. He talks about the fact that everything things is absolutely individual and unique and that language is a lie that makes us think that things are able to be put into categories with labels in his essay Truth and Lies in an Extra-Moral Sense. It is almost the total opposite of Bowers whole, but it can have basically the same affect: make all categorization and labeling provisional and in constant need of revision and updating. Derrida definitely undermines the ridged framework that Bowers is against, and even thinkers like Kant and Hegel can be read to go against it to certain degrees. (With Kant we can never know things in themselves; we can only know them as humans know them. With Hegel things are essentially historically relative and we can really only be expected to know things according to our time in history. Both leave space for continual revision and re-evaluation of how we categorize, label and even see the world.) Given possibilities like these, I think it is not necessary and even more risky to try to import non-Western systems into the contemporary Western context to try to fix what are very Western problems.  (I can’t find the source or a quote now, but I remember reading about Heidegger’s correspondence with at least one Japanese philosopher and how he found Easter thought interesting but was insistent that the way forward for the West had to come out of the Western tradition and not from an outside source. I very much agree with that.)

It is possible that he is avoiding giants of the Western tradition because there is so much involved in reading, interpreting and understanding them. The ideas I offered above are by no means uncontroversial takes on the writers I mentioned. The Western tradition (as far as I know it compared to the East) has a much more complex and even ridged way or dealing with thought traditions and texts. (But maybe the east has a tradition and it is not a print one, so those of us on the outside simply miss it.) It is not easy to get into the discussion that makes up Western philosophy, or to get into some of the texts; Kant, Hegel, Nietzsche and Heidegger are not always accessible to the everyday reader. Maybe that is why he jumps to the Eastern and indigenous traditions which tend to be more poetic and (at least to those of us that are not part of the Eastern tradition) less burdened with a complex (printed?) history or interpretation and discussion. But are they really less debated and interpreted? Or is he simplifying them to present them as such, and we just don’t realize it because we are ignorant of the tradition and culture they come from? I am not sure, but I am suspicious.

Chapter 5, "The Digital Revolution in Muslim Cultures"

Bowers hands over the wheel to Joseph Progler and Azra Kianinejad in this chapter.  The co-authors first provide a theoretical framework for addressing their central concern and then provide several concrete examples from Iran and other Muslim nations to illustrate their thesis.

I don't have much to say about their theorizing which recapitulates much of what Bowers has said in Chapters 1-4.  I question their assertion that: "Communication technologies and social media, while promoting the illusion of connecting people with each other and with information, undermine face-to-face and intergenerational relationships with the past, with one another, with knowledge of the environment" (p. 46).  To be fair, I might have different working definitions of each of these terms, but I think communication technologies/social media can sustain healthy relationships between friends and family.  Indeed, I personally rely on them.   I also find the following assertion puzzling: "Colonization proceeds in moving away from local cultures and traditions and toward global ones that are promoted as universal" (p. 49).  I don't know what they mean by "global", but surely this statement should read "and toward Western ideology."  The shift isn't from local to global; it's from colonized/oppressed to colonizer/oppressor, which might very well purport to be "universal".  That might be a minor point, but it treats the power dynamics more seriously.

I like the coauthors' discussion of the hierarchy of knowledge in the digital revolution: "...digital technologies have a profound impact on culture by sifting, sorting, and prioritizing one form of knowledge, that which is print based and easily digitized, over other forms of knowledge that are vernacular, experiential, and non-digitizable" (p. 52).  Yet, I would add that the printed word is not paramount but rather the image, moving image, and accompanying sound are (i.e. pictures, clips, and movies).  Online cultures are dominantly concrete and visual/imagery-based, at least in my experience with youth culture in the U.S.  I also know that the digital revolution enables many local subcultures (as small as friend groups on Instagram and Snapchat and as geographically large as affinity groups on Facebook) to flourish.

Toward the end, I kept thinking, What do they mean?  And, not necessarily.  "Digitization creates an ephemeral abstract world of free-floating information detached from people and places that makes all books look the same and reduces the reading experience to the uniform scanning of electronic texts" (p. 57).  Really?  How so?

Their examples of local traditions replaced because of the digital revolution were puzzling and sometimes anachronistic (e.g. their longing for illuminated manuscripts (?) - that ship sailed 700 years ago).  There are many reasons why people no longer organize locally to track the movements of the sun and moon for religious ceremony and why there is no longer a professional singer for the call to prayer.  Their view strikes me as nostalgic, though I do see how the more direct relationship with nature to organize religious events on a local scale would lead to greater reverence for the Earth.  So maybe they're onto something.

Bowers, Chapters 3 & 4

I have read several times Chapter 3 "Misconceptions About Language" and Ch. 4 "Digital Colonization" which work closely together.

Ch. 3 discusses the ways that unthinking/uncritical/unquestioning "computer futurist writers" do not understand the "reality constructing nature of language" (p. 26).  In their view, language, especially the written word, is merely a "conduit" for the communication of objective knowledge.  This view or collection of assumptions about language, according to Bowers, is hazardous, for it leaves out "the dynamic, emergent, and relational processes occurring as people interact with each other and with the environment" (p. 27).  Moreover, it perpetuates a Western interpretive framework/ideology/worldview that is capitalist and consumer-driven.  The latter two, of course, lead to the abuse and exploitation of the Earth's resources and ecological devastation.

Ch. 4 builds on this argument, furthering the claim that Western technologies are the latest form of imperialism and colonization.  The same computer scientists and capitalists believe Western culture, as reproduced and disseminated in the English language with its implicit ways of thinking, is superior to "local" cultures. The latter, for Bowers, are much more ecologically-minded: "But many of these oral cultures have acquired knowledge of local ecosystems that is quite astonishing... Survival for these oral cultures depended upon their ability to adapt their values and practices to what the natural systems could sustain" (p. 39, my emphasis).

Bowers concludes Ch. 4 by showing the "hubris" of a Western attempt at colonization in Peru, viz. the "One Laptop Per Child" program and then describing an alternative educational program that preserves local culture.

For me, these were my two favorite chapters thus far.  Bowers (finally!) gives clear examples.  He also explains the way that languages have embedded ideologies and that part of our roles as speakers in a language community after primary socialization is to investigate and sometimes interrogate our language for its assumptions about reality.

I also appreciated his examples of "non-technological" approaches to education which embrace tradition: "Learning is face-to-face, and what is shared is how to exercise ecological intelligence--that is, to be aware and interpret the information and others semiotic signs of how to nurture relationships in both local cultural and environmental ecologies" (p. 45).  But here I wonder, in his embrace of localism, is he romanticizing local cultures?  Wouldn't it be beneficial for every language community to understand its own assumptions and prejudices?  That seems like a responsible task for anyone on this planet, to get out of our own ego- and socio-centrism.

Lastly, I read his "three misconceptions" (p. 40) with great interest and an open mind.  They are: (1) computers are mere tools, (2) the accuracy of constructivism, and (3) the importance of literacy for the modern world.  I happen to believe all three misconceptions, alas... But I think I understand his rationale, except perhaps for #2.

Bowers Reading 2: The Myth of Progress

The main idea of this chapter seems to be his criticism of progress. He identifies it as a myth and then picks it apart in different ways. I am not going to talk about progress directly here. I am going to pick out parts of his attack on it and examine those. In the end, I like his attack on progress, but I am a bit disappointed in that fact that he doesn’t explain a few things in more detail and he also seems to not go far enough for me in some of his criticism—he seems to use his method selectively. 


Myth and ideology:
He starts by offering different definitions of what a myth is. I was pretty excited about this at first because I thought maybe he was going to try to rehabilitate the idea of myth. At first he says that myth is a story that is believed but is not true. Well, this for me is just dull and avoids the point because we haven’t established what the criterion for truth is. I was excited to hear the Bruce Lincoln definition as “ideology in narrative form.” They can be “truthful depictions of historical events, as an allegory or personification of natural phenomenon, or as an explanation of ritual.” According to Bowers, Lincoln also says that “They are used to convey religious or idealized experience, to establish behavioral models, and to teach.” This to me is a fairly exciting definition of myth. 

Myth has usefulness and meaning though it may not be factually true or accurate in a strict sense. It was very disappointing for me to see Bowers pass this by and move on to talk about a definition from James Conway that says myth is a story or ideology that is untrue. It seems odd that he would move in that direction even though he points out that this means “today’s decedents from ancient cultures living in non-Westernized regions of the world, would be faced with acknowledging that their current lives are based on lies, misconceptions and illusions.” That seems to go against his desire to promote and preserve localism and multiculturalism. He doesn’t stop on that definition, but he does say that it has given him insights that influence what he does settle on.

Bowers’ final definition is “an ideology or, in a more limited sense, as an idea that justifies a series of behaviors and values that are based on misconceptions and illusions essentially destructive to the well-being of a community and the environment.” As I understand it, he is saying that it is an untrue story (like Conway did) and using as his truth criterion that something is untrue if it is “destructive to the well-being of a community and the environment.” This equates myths with lies or misconceptions (the first intentional the second not necessarily so) that are destructive for the people that believe them. I am not sure why he needs to use the word myth here at all and can’t just talk about lies and misconceptions. But that may just be a problem I have because I think myth can be good in many cases and in some ways are actually essential.



Ideology and vocabulary:
Though he does distinguish myth from ideology, Bowers does keep them very close and treat them both as mostly negative. While I agree that “Ideologies control thinking by providing the vocabulary that aligns everyday behaviors and values”, I think he goes a bit too far when he adds that, “The vocabulary is especially important in that it ensures conformity of thinking while at the same time excluding alterative vocabularies and thus alternative ways of thinking and acting.” Words have histories and are living things. An ideology can try to keep the words from changing (or at least in ways that it finds undesirable) and keep their histories hidden, but that is always a struggle and the ideology is never absolutely capable of controlling the words. It is hard for things to change, but they always can and do. 

I would also add that I have been hugely influenced by Nietzsche’s “Truth and Lies” essay. Nietzsche would agree when Bowers says that language controls our “thinking by providing the vocabulary that aligns everyday behaviors and values,” including our understanding of reality and truth. For him, that is what makes a comprehensible world that we can live in together. The point is not to get beyond that (as Bowers seems to me to suggest we need to, but hasn’t yet explained how or what that would be or look like) but to keep the language and/or ideology fresh and in touch with lived experience, goals, outcomes and sustainability of the community that uses them. (Or that is the way I have come to understand Nietzsche.) Bowers seems to suggest that there is something better suited than myth and ideology when it comes to founding language, truth and reality. (Actually, I am not even sure he would question if reality needs to be founded, and maybe not even truth.)



Tradition and Traditionalism:
I like the way that he values tradition and at the same time acknowledges that they are never fixed and are always changing and in need to change. “Time-less and unchanging” traditions don’t exists (or shouldn’t), and traditions are always changing: adapting or evolving. To think that a tradition is unchanging and timeless is rightly called traditionalism, which is really a kind of fundamentalism. Traditions are alive and (should be) dynamic.



Moore’s Law:
The point about Moore’s Law is very good. However, I do wish he would go into why it “is not a law in the same sense as the law of gravity or the law governing the speed of light.” My guess is that those other two laws are physical laws that don’t require human involvement. Gravity and light do what they do if humans are there to watch or not, or even if humans never were. Moore’s Law is like a law in economics or political science. These things require human involvement and really are based on human involvement and activities. If people are not motivated to research ways to fit more transistors into a smaller space, then there will be no progress. Motivation may be curiosity, profit, the belief that progress in this area will have some positive benefit in the world, etc. If people weren’t motivated and did not believe it was possible and desirable, Moore’s Law would not continue to be true. Another issue is the funding to do the research. If money isn’t there to do the research, then it won’t be done and progress won’t happen: the law will not continue to be true. People have an effect on things: how they turnout, how well ideas work, etc.

My guess is that that is what he means but saying they are different, but he doesn’t explain. I wish he would. And I think if he explained this at this point, he would be able to take a more nuanced position on capitalism later. 


Capitalism:
He does well to say that “the primary value of the capitalist system is achieving the greatest possible level of profits.” Yet, this goes against at least two of the economic theorists that he mentions. Smith and Friedman are two that I am familiar with and my reading of them (which is by no means unusual) puts them at odds with this simplification of capitalism and its primary value. Bowers seems to equate selfish interest with self-interest. Yes, that is the way that most people who are pro-capitalism these days see it: they reduce self-interest to profit and see that as the highest value of capitalism. However, when he talks about this drive contaminating politics and government, he is assuming that economics becomes the primary system of values and thinking that govern most of what happens in society. That may be true, but that is not what Smith and Friedman advocated. 

They both saw economics as a field that was not all encompassing, that should coexist with politics, science, etc. as equals having their own purviews and limits. That has been lost in general society. Bowers would do well to talk about how a more positive tradition of capitalism was lost somewhere along the way and maybe see how we can reclaim it. He wants to reclaim localism and other traditions, but he doesn’t look in to the history of capitalism like I think he easily could and see where that could be revived to make it more positive. (Below is a link to something I had been thinking about doing anyway, and I already had some notes and quotes. I finished it to go along with this.) 


On Social Justice:
He is critical of the traditions of capitalism and technology, but he seems to take the traditions of social justice and localism as being without downsides. He says that there are some, “misconceptions and biases of earlier eras, that should not have been constructed in the first place.” Examples he gives are ones that are contrary to our current ideas of social justice like slavery and equality. Now, I don’t mean to justify slavery or inequality, but these are modern values that have come up over time; they are historically relative and have a history and language of their own. However, he seems to want to make them universal (against his championing of localism and cultural diversity) and eternal (against his idea that everything has a history). 

I wonder if this is a blind spot in his thinking, or if he has arguments for doing this that he is just not presenting. He gives reasons for questioning our current thinking on progress and technology, but then he takes up social justice and other things without justifying why they should not also be critiqued. (Or maybe I am being way too much of a post-modernist here.) 



In the end, I still like much of what he has to say because he is taking things to a deeper level than usual. However, I think he is being a bit vague in some places and a bit selective as to where he does go deeper. It makes me think that all of this is done just to push his position on environmentalism, which wouldn’t be bad. Yet, that makes this more of a polemic than a work of philosophy or deeper social criticism. 


Adam Smith And Spontaneous Order: Capitalism, Sympathy and Community

Bowers Reading One: Main Ideas and Issues

Introduction:

I like what Bowers has laid out so far, and I will touch on the main things I am excited about below.  However, I am a bit disappointed that he hasn’t gone in to more detail about the foundations and influences of his thought.  He wants to emphasize the history and ecology of things like language, tradition and culture—and to talk about emergence—but I don’t see him giving an ecology, history or account of where from or how his ideas have emerged.  Being the geek I am (or half-assed scholar, or dilettante might be better words) I want to know if Nietzsche, Korzybski or who had an influence on his conception of language.  Maybe that will come later, or maybe I will have to look to another book of his to find that. 

A couple of issues with word choice:

First, I am not happy with his choice of the word ecological to talk about the complex and interdependent relationship between things.  I understand why he thinks it works: because it emphasizes that living and interactive nature of systems and relationships.  But he also seems to use the word in the more common sense as well: to talk about eco-systems and the environment.  This confuses me a bit sometimes. 

Neil Postman talks about ecological change in his book Technopoly, and the idea seems to be much the same as what Bowers means:

“One significant change generates total change.  If you remove the caterpillars from a given habitat, you are not left with the same environment minus caterpillars: you have a new environment, and you have reconstituted the conditions of survival; the same is true if you add caterpillars to an environment that has had none.” (Postman Technopoly).

I had always thought about pretty much the same idea in terms of ‘weight and balance’ (like when you load and pilot a plane or ship) until I read that in Postman a couple years ago.  Ecology is a much better way to put it.  So I do really like the idea, I just have a problem with the word ecology seeming to be used in two ways back and forth. 

Second, I am not sure what he means exactly by emergence at this point.  I guess it is simply that things come out of what is already there.  This means that nothing was just always there, that things come and go, and that they come out of and depend on what is/was there.  Maybe that is all it is.  I get the feeling that there should be more to it.  However, that is likely a pretty big thing for a lot of people who pick up the book, though for me it seems pretty obvious. 

Main ideas:

Choosing profits:

He says that the technology giants have put profit over the rejuvenation of democracy.  He seems to think that this is a deliberate choice. I am not sure it is or at least that it is that simple of a choice the way they approach it: do right by democracy or make profit.  I think a way to approach this would be using the set of god-words he pointed out: democracy, freedom and progress.  If approached this way, I think it comes kind of clear that they don’t see that as a choice of either/or.  I am not sure many of the leaders of the tech world see the real possibility of significant conflict between those three ideas and making a profit.  With progress comes more freedom and with freedom comes better democracy, especially if technology can also spread information which is always good for democracy.  Technology that is spreading freedom and helping democracy will be profitable because it will be popular: and what sells makes money.  I don’t think they question that some sort of spontaneous order will come about thought this.  That when freedom and democracy are combined with information and technology, progress towards a desirable world is inevitable.  It is like they believe in divine providence that comes into the world as long as we work towards these god-words. 

God-words:

Overall, I live the idea of the ‘god-words’ and the three he points out here.  They are ideas that are taken to be true, to be known, to be able to justify almost anything, and yet they are words that no one really has a clear and definite definition for though we use them as if we do. 

Internet goes deeper than polarization:

Another great point it is that the internet is damaging beyond the spread of ‘polarizing ideas.’  I see this as related to the conception of data, print and information as well.  Print and data are true or false and there is no need of interpretation.  As a result, something on the internet has a clear meaning and is either clearly true of clearly false—you just need to fact check it to find out which.  News is either real or fake, there is no third option.  This is the case because interpretation and values are ruled out as important: “while data and information, on the surface, appear to be value free, both are interpreted by their collectors and promoters within value-laden conceptual frameworks that emphasize efficiencies, predictive control, continues innovation and profits.”  This is a huge problem with contemporary communication which comes from a narrow conception of what information is and the forgetting of the importance context and culture.

The limits of data are swept aside:

A related point is that “What gets encoded in print or as data is only the surface phenomenon that the surveillance system is designed to represent as data.”  Context is left out.  This means the original context is left out and the context that the collectors were in when the collected and decided how to collect the data are left out.  They are in the margins (I think that is how Derrida might put it, right?) and not noticed unless someone has a disagreement or difficulty with the print or data.  While a discussion of the difficulty and where it comes from can bring context back in, that is usually not what we do these days.  We seem to condemn or insult those that we don’t understand or that don’t understand us. 

Data given supremacy:

He goes on from the misunderstanding and misrepresentation of what data is talk about the importance it is given.  Along with stripping information and data of its origins and context, it is given a privileged status.  Computer scientists have “their simplified and reductionist ways of thinking [which] lead them to assume that data, information and other forms of abstract representations should be the basis of decision making for everyone in the world.”  Lack of data is also cited by technologists as the reason for failures and backwardness in societies and of societies: “data deficiency that impedes their ability to progress economically and technologically.”  Bowers says quite clearly that data is seen as supreme and should replace other forms of knowing and thinking: “data must replace the authority of all other cultural forms of knowledge—as well as the wisdom traditions that are the basis of their moral values.”  

Conclusion:

I agree with his assessment and with his criticism of the modern western worldview.  I would like to hear more details and see a more detailed argument for all of this.  I like it, but it seems like he is preaching to the choir here, and I think this book would fall flat for a more regular audience. 

I also want to hear more about localism and how it is better for the environment.  I can see some ideas, but I hope he justifies this more. 

Apology:

I realize this seems a bit disorganized and random.  At this point I just wanted to get out what I think the big ideas are here so far.  I have also avoided drawing in things from the news that I think are examples or related; I am really not sure we want to go there.

New Project: Bowers Digital Detachment

The Book:

Digital Detachment: How Computer Culture Undermines Democracy by Chet Bowers

The Schedule:

June 15^th Reading one: Preface and Chapter 1

June 17^th Reading two: Chapter 2

June 20^th Reading three: Chapters 3 and 4

June 23^rd Reading four: Chapter 5

June 26^th Reading five: Chapter 6

June 29^th Reading six: Chapter 7

I am not at all convinced that the universe is conscious.  I understand why the Stoics assume that it is; for them it seems like a necessity for their system to work.  If you start with the idea that there are only two things—matter and consciousness—and that only consciousness can move then you need the universe to have consciousness or it would follow that humans and gods (and any other creatures that are conscious) would be in control of the universe.  Put in that position, I would choose a rational and conscious universe as well.  (Correct me if I am wrong on my understanding of Stoic foundations.) 

Given that I am not in a position to have to assume the consciousness of the universe, I don’t.  The issue of rational intelligibility of the universe (RIU) is also something that I have an issue with.  However, I have much less of an issues with that than with consciousness.  My main issues with RIU is that it can easily lead to scientism.  (We should talk about this and what exactly it means to us at some point.  Upon request I will put up some Sloan quotes that I like to get us started.) Assuming that the universe is intelligible opens the door to the assumption that we can fully understand it.  That is not the only path to take from there of course.  Sloan assumes RIU (and has a good argument for it) and then makes sure to limit this so as to rule out our ever fully understanding it, especially via science and only science.  That is something that I can accept and deal with as a position that others hold; it is not something that I feel comfortable with personally.  I think it leaves far too much room for falling into scientism.  If you don’t follow his argument for limiting our ability to understand, or if you fail to think about limits at all, you easily fall into the assumption that we can fully understand the universe.  This is, I think, a huge danger. 

To avoid that danger, I think assuming that the universe is not intelligible is the better (more humble and less dangerous) path to take.  A position like the one that Camus takes allows us to use science to understand as a way to predict and manipulate the material world, and this leads to technology and many good things.  It also limits science to dealing with the physical world and sets the limits to what it can and does achieve: prediction and manipulation.  (I am skipping the very basic argument that I have in my head for this, but rest assured that I know that this looks like a pretty big leap here.)  This leaves room for other disciplines to deal with issues like meaning, purpose and significance in their own way without the pressure of having to be scientific in their method and material.  For me that is of paramount importance. 

What I like about phrasing the problem the way that I did in my original post is that it makes even the RIU position an assumption that must acknowledge that it is such.  I hope that making people aware of that can be a deterrent for scientism.  RIU is based on a leap of faith and therefore science itself is as well.  That seems key to me when it comes to limiting human hubris and avoiding scientism.

I like the turn that you take towards Nietzsche.  And of course, some interpretations are better than others. In my opinion that is the history of humanity, and philosophy.  In that respect I think that values and goals are the most important part of any human endeavor.  Those things help define what you mean by ‘better.’  In the middle ages there was not much that humans could do to control their physical situation, especially against disease—at least in comparison to what we can do today.  The spiritual aspect of the human was more highly valued then.  You may be poor and in pain and you may die, so focusing on the spiritual made life more bearable.  You had the after-life, you had the solace of prayer.  These may sound like fairy tales and hollow comforts to modern day people, but they were real then.  (I see the Middle Ages as being the Dark Ages only because our values are so different from the ones we have today.)

If you values democracy and the rule of law, these things then influence what kind of interpretations are better: which best foster those ideas to spread and be believed in, and which are more geared toward making them work.  You may accept a bit of chaos and waste in the world in order to allow the people to have their say and to enforce laws.  If you value comfort and long life then you will see science and technology as being a better way of looking at the world than most traditional religions.  Values, at lease the way that I see it, are foundations of primary interpretations—of assumptions. 

However, I don’t see any of this as being linear where you can say that the values come first.  In fact, I have given up the idea that history, life or any sort of meaningful argument or interpretation of the world is linear.  (At least not ones that don’t tend to over simplify the subjects, which has its time and place for sure, but is not ‘reality.’)  Progress is defined according to values that the people telling history hold—not just by the winners.  I see things as being complex interconnected systems, like an ecosystem.  Part of this comes from meditations on (and even an early misunderstanding of) Heidegger’s use of the term ‘hermeneutic circle’ and Derrida’s idea of ‘play.’  Even influenced by Heidegger’s history of Being. As the idea of what Being is changes, the rest of the network of interpretations changes, in fact must change, as well.  I wanted to see the hermeneutic circle not as the circular reasoning that is at the foundation of human thought (the virtuous circle as he puts it, that starts with an assumption and leads to a system of interpretations and then sooner or later goes back to the assumption and re-interprets it) but also as the network of meanings that all undergo re-interpretation as items in the network change meaning.  That is where Derrida’s idea of play comes in.  Everything in interrelated and since nothing is stable—no indisputable foundation or center—everything is in constant play.  (I also agree with what Heidegger meant when using the phrase hermeneutic circle and agree that it is a virtuous circle, not a vicious one, especially if we are aware of it.)

In that way I see everything as a sort of evolution, but not in the way that most people think of evolution.  It is not progress and it is not linear. It is an ecosystem in which different elements (words, ideas, symbols etc. in philosophy, and different creatures, materials and environmental factors in nature) are constantly changing and adapting to each other.  It is adaptation that causes others to have to adapt as a result.  It is not directed and it is not linear.  It can be interpreted as a story of progress but only after you assume values according to which you will interpret it.  This too is how I would like to read Nietzsche’s eternal recurrence: the never ending cycle of adaptation. 

It is because science, and as a result RIU, thinks mostly about linear, material, cause and effect relationships that I am suspicious of science being seen as the main way to look at the world, especially when it comes to meaning and even philosophy.  A linear approach will all too easily allow for a leveling out of experience and networks of meaning, making them seems simple, easy and self-evident.  That is another reason why I think assuming that the universe is not rational and that we simply impose our rational thought systems on to it is a better approach.  It leaves the multi-dimensional, non-linear world behind the veil (or under the grid) to be rediscovered and always respected.  We can use the veil or the grid and get ‘progress’ out of it, but we must always be aware on some level that the messy reality is under it.

 

Ah, and I think I should stop for now….