I am not at all convinced that the universe is conscious.  I understand why the Stoics assume that it is; for them it seems like a necessity for their system to work.  If you start with the idea that there are only two things—matter and consciousness—and that only consciousness can move then you need the universe to have consciousness or it would follow that humans and gods (and any other creatures that are conscious) would be in control of the universe.  Put in that position, I would choose a rational and conscious universe as well.  (Correct me if I am wrong on my understanding of Stoic foundations.) 

Given that I am not in a position to have to assume the consciousness of the universe, I don’t.  The issue of rational intelligibility of the universe (RIU) is also something that I have an issue with.  However, I have much less of an issues with that than with consciousness.  My main issues with RIU is that it can easily lead to scientism.  (We should talk about this and what exactly it means to us at some point.  Upon request I will put up some Sloan quotes that I like to get us started.) Assuming that the universe is intelligible opens the door to the assumption that we can fully understand it.  That is not the only path to take from there of course.  Sloan assumes RIU (and has a good argument for it) and then makes sure to limit this so as to rule out our ever fully understanding it, especially via science and only science.  That is something that I can accept and deal with as a position that others hold; it is not something that I feel comfortable with personally.  I think it leaves far too much room for falling into scientism.  If you don’t follow his argument for limiting our ability to understand, or if you fail to think about limits at all, you easily fall into the assumption that we can fully understand the universe.  This is, I think, a huge danger. 

To avoid that danger, I think assuming that the universe is not intelligible is the better (more humble and less dangerous) path to take.  A position like the one that Camus takes allows us to use science to understand as a way to predict and manipulate the material world, and this leads to technology and many good things.  It also limits science to dealing with the physical world and sets the limits to what it can and does achieve: prediction and manipulation.  (I am skipping the very basic argument that I have in my head for this, but rest assured that I know that this looks like a pretty big leap here.)  This leaves room for other disciplines to deal with issues like meaning, purpose and significance in their own way without the pressure of having to be scientific in their method and material.  For me that is of paramount importance. 

What I like about phrasing the problem the way that I did in my original post is that it makes even the RIU position an assumption that must acknowledge that it is such.  I hope that making people aware of that can be a deterrent for scientism.  RIU is based on a leap of faith and therefore science itself is as well.  That seems key to me when it comes to limiting human hubris and avoiding scientism.

I like the turn that you take towards Nietzsche.  And of course, some interpretations are better than others. In my opinion that is the history of humanity, and philosophy.  In that respect I think that values and goals are the most important part of any human endeavor.  Those things help define what you mean by ‘better.’  In the middle ages there was not much that humans could do to control their physical situation, especially against disease—at least in comparison to what we can do today.  The spiritual aspect of the human was more highly valued then.  You may be poor and in pain and you may die, so focusing on the spiritual made life more bearable.  You had the after-life, you had the solace of prayer.  These may sound like fairy tales and hollow comforts to modern day people, but they were real then.  (I see the Middle Ages as being the Dark Ages only because our values are so different from the ones we have today.)

If you values democracy and the rule of law, these things then influence what kind of interpretations are better: which best foster those ideas to spread and be believed in, and which are more geared toward making them work.  You may accept a bit of chaos and waste in the world in order to allow the people to have their say and to enforce laws.  If you value comfort and long life then you will see science and technology as being a better way of looking at the world than most traditional religions.  Values, at lease the way that I see it, are foundations of primary interpretations—of assumptions. 

However, I don’t see any of this as being linear where you can say that the values come first.  In fact, I have given up the idea that history, life or any sort of meaningful argument or interpretation of the world is linear.  (At least not ones that don’t tend to over simplify the subjects, which has its time and place for sure, but is not ‘reality.’)  Progress is defined according to values that the people telling history hold—not just by the winners.  I see things as being complex interconnected systems, like an ecosystem.  Part of this comes from meditations on (and even an early misunderstanding of) Heidegger’s use of the term ‘hermeneutic circle’ and Derrida’s idea of ‘play.’  Even influenced by Heidegger’s history of Being. As the idea of what Being is changes, the rest of the network of interpretations changes, in fact must change, as well.  I wanted to see the hermeneutic circle not as the circular reasoning that is at the foundation of human thought (the virtuous circle as he puts it, that starts with an assumption and leads to a system of interpretations and then sooner or later goes back to the assumption and re-interprets it) but also as the network of meanings that all undergo re-interpretation as items in the network change meaning.  That is where Derrida’s idea of play comes in.  Everything in interrelated and since nothing is stable—no indisputable foundation or center—everything is in constant play.  (I also agree with what Heidegger meant when using the phrase hermeneutic circle and agree that it is a virtuous circle, not a vicious one, especially if we are aware of it.)

In that way I see everything as a sort of evolution, but not in the way that most people think of evolution.  It is not progress and it is not linear. It is an ecosystem in which different elements (words, ideas, symbols etc. in philosophy, and different creatures, materials and environmental factors in nature) are constantly changing and adapting to each other.  It is adaptation that causes others to have to adapt as a result.  It is not directed and it is not linear.  It can be interpreted as a story of progress but only after you assume values according to which you will interpret it.  This too is how I would like to read Nietzsche’s eternal recurrence: the never ending cycle of adaptation. 

It is because science, and as a result RIU, thinks mostly about linear, material, cause and effect relationships that I am suspicious of science being seen as the main way to look at the world, especially when it comes to meaning and even philosophy.  A linear approach will all too easily allow for a leveling out of experience and networks of meaning, making them seems simple, easy and self-evident.  That is another reason why I think assuming that the universe is not rational and that we simply impose our rational thought systems on to it is a better approach.  It leaves the multi-dimensional, non-linear world behind the veil (or under the grid) to be rediscovered and always respected.  We can use the veil or the grid and get ‘progress’ out of it, but we must always be aware on some level that the messy reality is under it.

 

Ah, and I think I should stop for now….   

Messy First Thoughts

Over the years, I have gone back and forth on this question.  At one point, I sided with Camus: Human beings make meaning.  It’s our nature. However, the universe is indifferent to our efforts, so our project of meaning-making is paradoxical and absurd but also necessary and heroic.  (Zo, correct me if my simplification of Camus is incorrect.)  But, more recently, as I search for a system of thought and values, I think I am inclined toward the rational intelligibility of the universe (RIU).  The Stoics actually say that the cosmos is both rational and conscious although I am not sure I want to go that far… yet.

At the moment, I cannot mount a defense of RIU, but in true dialogical fashion I hope we can hash out some of the thinking surrounding both the claim itself and the postmodern refutation of the claim.

I totally understand why Zo says that the postmodern claim against RIU is less of a leap of faith.  RIU requires so much – the existence of an external world, the accuracy of our sensory data, the mind’s ability to discern patterns and express (in language) that pattern, which both explains phenomena and can predict future instances of that phenomena.  This is exactly how the human mind works starting at infancy.  Nonetheless, because we naturally work this way, does not mean it is true…

We do have interpretations, but even for Nietzsche some interpretations are better than others.  “Better” for Nietzsche might be described as “healthier for human beings and their flourishing.”  Nietzsche’s reading of the world is meant to be liberatory.  For science, “better” might mean more successful at predicting phenomena; it’s highly pragmatic. 

But why are certain theories more successful than others?  I would rather be a patient now than in the Middle Ages because I feel we have a much better understanding of the way the human body works.  I hope I’m not sounding like a naïve realist, but do postmodernists have a way of ranking interpretations?  They cannot claim that all interpretations are equal, can they?

I completely agree that science is “hanging in the air” like all other systems of thought.  It requires deep faith at fundamental levels.

*** (a realization crystallizes) ***

I am not sure that RIU, for me, entails the epistemic claim that we can have perfect knowledge.  I think the universe changes too much for us to be able to formulate grand, enduring theses, like unified theory.  (There is, according to one of my students, evidence that the Laws of Nature change over time.) 

I want to hold onto RIU and hermeneutics because of all the limiting factors between the connection of self and universe.  Is this possible?  For me, there are truths (not Truths), but our access to those truths is imperfect, which demands an intellectual humility vis-à-vis knowledge-claims. 

Yikes, I feel all over the map, here.  But thinking is messy!

Faith & Science: Is The World Rational?

As AJ and I have  been talking recently a few themes keep reoccurring. One is issues dealing with technology and the effect on how we live: mostly how we think.  An other is the importance of having a system of values to help navigate modern life; for some it is religion and some philosophy and others don't have one, but we both are convinced that it is important.  One area where these two, and other topics, meet is in the question of faith in science and more specifically the question of weather or not the world is rational.  It is with this question/ topic that we start our next adventure.

I offer these ruminations of mine from a couple months back as the starting point:

Foundations

Science assumes that the physical world is understandable. From this comes the idea that our inability to understand it comes from our inability to be totally objective, or the limited nature of our intellect.

Most strains of post-modern philosophy assume that the world is not understandable, or meaningful. It attributes understanding and meaning to human beings alone. We impose systems and ideas on to the physical world to make it understandable.

I find the latter to be a more reasonable assumption, less of a leap of faith. This is at least in part because we know ourselves better (though not in a scientific way, in more of a wisdom way) than we can know the world.

From this assumption comes Nietzsche's proclamation, "There are no facts only interpretation." And Heidegger looks at this in a fairly systematic way when he talks of uncovering and concealing. As we understand (as we impose a system on to the world that makes it comprehensible) we not only uncover things-- accentuate or highlight things that are there-- but we conceal things-- cover over things that are also there, or simple thrust them into the shadows of the things we accentuate. We can never uncover everything at once because that would not be understandable because the world as a whole is not comprehensible.

This leaves science hanging in the air like all other human thought systems.